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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the field of economics the issue of economic development is a frequently debated 
and often controversial issue. Standpoints on how to most efficiently promote long-
term economic development in a given country varies from the standpoint of 
deregulation and free-market advocacy of the Washington consensus, to the  
standpoint of extensive state-intervention and state-ownership of dependency or 
Marxist theory. While there is a trend in academia to espouse the virtues of 
globalisation in terms of increased trade as the caricature of the bad samaritans in 
Chang’s (2007) book portrays, some economists do also believe that developing 
countries need to integrate slowly into the global economy and develop their own 
industrial productive capabilities in order to create a solid foundation for long-term 
economic growth (Chang 2003; Chang 2007; Wade 2012). 
 
With virtually every developed country in the world having used protectionist 
measures in the past in order to develop productive capabilities before they were 
ready to compete on the international market, it is now interesting to examine how 
many contemporary developing countries are integrating into the global economy 
having less competitive industries (Chang, 2007). However, there is a range of 
strategies a country can pursue. 
 
Are these countries going to pursue a very specific strategy regarding industrial 
policies or are they going to take the orthodox neoclassical view and open up 
extensively to foreign investors without having developed more modern and 
diversified economies first? Another strategy can also be that new development 
strategies can be made by combining ideas from both strategies, whereby a country 
opens up its economy to investment and trade, but creates policies to attract a 
certain type of investment and at the same time protects other industries with 
regulations.  
 
The mainstream understanding of economic development in Latin American 
countries, is that for many years, since the 1940s, the countries relied on 
protectionist approaches and Import Substitution Industrialization to manage their 
economies, which include specific initiatives by the state to develop local industry 
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and high import tariffs, in order to protect domestic industries. This caused large 
fiscal deficits, runaway inflation and a currency crisis, which led to the “Lost Decade” 
of the 1980s, where many Latin American countries started adopting more market 
oriented approaches with the Washington Consensus Reforms. During the first half 
of the 1990s, there was great hope that these new policies could spur growth. 
Inflation was declining and economies were growing, hope however was short lived 
(Kingstone, 2011). It turned out that efficiency and investment never really improved 
sufficiently and the state of Latin American institutions, which are normally 
considered crucial for a country to have sustained growth, remained poor. Moreover 
many countries pegged their local currencies to the U.S. Dollar at artificially high 
levels, governments continued to run large deficits and eventually many countries 
were thrown into massive currency crises leading to the Latin American financial 
crisis at the turn of the millennium (Kingstone, 2011).  
 
This led to frustration and discontent towards the western institutions who had given 
the incentive for the reforms. Particularly the policies of the International Financial 
Institutions were criticised as a cause of the neoclassical policies of deregulation 
which led to the 2008 economic crisis and so triggered a challenge to the 
neoclassical recipe for development. According to Neoclassical economics the way 
to develop the economy in developing countries is to increase the freedom of the 
markets and follow the strategy of comparative advantage first developed by David 
Ricardo.  
 
This economic school of thought was challenged in Latin America in particular by the 
writings of Rául Prebisch who came to head the United Nations Economic 
Commission on Latin America during the post WW2 era (Kingstone, 2011). 
Prebisch tried to develop a system that was designed to get Latin American 
countries out of what he saw as being just commodity producing countries. The 
recipe for this was for the state to intervene and use its power and resources to 
foster a domestic industry in manufacturing, thus developing the economy from an 
economy only exporting raw goods into an industrialized economy.  
 
This was further supported by the writings of Albert Hirschman and others. He 
argued that developing a manufacturing industry would automatically spur the 
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development of other industries and businesses that provide the parts, materials, 
distribution, infrastructure and equipment to run that industry (Kingstone, 2011). 
Industrial development would also further employment opportunities in the local 
economy and pay out better wages, thus developing an internal market in the 
process, which would promote internal investment and domestic consumption. Such 
economic development was seen as a contrast to the previous models of just 
exporting raw goods, which was widespread in Latin America before WW2 (Cypher 
& Dietz, 2004).  
 
This challenge comes from the increasing number of reasons for returning to 
industrial policy strategies (although these strategies never disappeared) as a better 
way of developing the economy than free markets (Wade, 2012). Looking at the 
overall development in Latin America after the implementation of the Neo-liberal 
doctrines from the 1980’s the economic performance of the region has been rather 
poor compared with the preceding decades and it becomes clear that the neoliberal 
reforms have not had the intended impact (Sánchez-Ancochea, 2009).  
 
One apparent exception to this story of Latin America is Costa Rica. Costa Rica has 
been mentioned as a stark contrast to this general picture, as the Costa Rican 
economy has since the late 1980’s been diversified, and has attracted a lot of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) specifically channelled into the production of high-tech 
manufactured goods, especially the micro-chip and semiconductor industries. The 
combination of having a relatively educated workforce and low wages have made the 
country very attractive to high-tech FDI (Trejos, 2009). There is, though, a debate in 
the literature on whether or not FDI in Costa Rica has actually led to spillovers 
(Gallagher & Paus, 2007; Paus 2005; Monge et.al. 2012; Leiva et.al. 2014). The 
country also currently has one of the most healthy populations in the region, and are 
very close to being energy independent with the household energy production being 
based almost entirely on renewables, which until recently was produced and 
distributed entirely by the state run energy firms (Tufft, 2015).  
 
We will therefore analyse the impact of FDI in Costa Rica in relation to its overall 
industrial policy and then analyse how their approach of regulating the economy has 
influenced economic development. This leads us to our research question. 
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1.1 Research Question 
 
How have the governments of Costa Rica used FDI to increase 
production in high-tech manufacturing and what has been the impact of 
the strategy pursued? 
 
Sub-questions 
 
1. How has the use of Import Substitution Industrialisation by Costa Rican 
governments, before the debt crisis and de-regulation of the 1980’s, structured their 
economy and what framework has it set for their present economic performance? 
 
2. How has the Costa Rican government attracted and regulated FDI and how did it 
fit into their overall development plan?  
 
3. What has been the long-term impact of the open approach to FDI which Costa 
Rica governments have pursued? 
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1.2 Project design 
 
In this section the different methodological choices made during the project will be 
explained, starting with the choice of theory. Furthermore, the selection of sources 
for this project will be explained and the structure will be presented. 
 
1.2.1 Choice of theory 
Due to our own inclination towards a more heterodox approach to economics and 
our course in economics this semester also adopting an approach clearly critical of 
the orthodox school of thought, we have chosen theory that examines FDI from a 
pro-regulation standpoint that is also critical of whether or not the overall impact of 
increased FDI in the global economy is entirely positive. That is to say, developing 
countries need to regulate in a certain way to make it fit their overall development 
path. We have chosen theory that allow us to adopt a qualitative approach to 
economics, which is also based on our lack of skill regarding quantitative methods. 
 
1.2.2 Sources 
All of our empirical sources come from primary and secondary sources, therefore we 
have gathered sources analysing the different developmental processes and 
industrial policies in Costa Rica. This project uses the different results from the 
sources gathered to evaluate the effectiveness of development strategies in Costa 
Rica, in order to get a better understanding of the effectiveness of the FDI strategy 
used in Costa Rica, and the implications of this strategy regarding the different 
ideological discourses about development in political economy. 
 
When doing research from a heterodox perspective, articles and journal publications 
gathered will view the current orthodoxy on development from a critical perspective. 
Therefore we are inclined to not use orthodox analyses of the Costa Rican situation. 
We are aware of the existence in the literature of orthodox theories of development 
which are less focused on industrial capabilities, since orthodox development 
economics is not our focal point we have decided to focus on that approach of 
development through more critical lenses. Although we recognize that a general 
understanding of the orthodox perspective may also be useful in our project in order 
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to do a critique of the traditional neoliberal approach to economic development in the 
developing world.  
 
In regards to our theoretical framework, we have chosen to have our focus primarily 
on literature supportive of a regulatory stance on FDI and to focus on the common 
positive and negative features of FDI that are common in the development literature 
and try to place our findings in the literature. 
 
Sources providing an overview of the historical political economy of Latin America 
(Kingstone, 2011) and Costa Rica (Nelson, 1984; Rankin, 2010) are used in order to 
find the focal differences between the general picture and the specific factors that 
allowed Costa Rica to be regarded as a standout case in the region. For our 
analysis, contemporary sources specifically focused on Costa Rica and FDI are used 
in order to gain an in-depth view of the relevant aspects of FDI in Costa Rica. Papers 
from the World Bank and the OECD are used to provide relevant stats and insights 
into legal matters.  
 
Because we faced difficulties finding the relevant data and statistics in our readings 
of secondary peer-reviewed literature, we sought out different Costa Rican 
government institutions and regional institutions for the needed empirical data. 
These include COMEX (Ministerio de Comercio de Exterior), MIDELPLAN (Ministerio 
de Planificación Nacional y Política económica), MEIC (Minesterio de Economia, 
Industria y Comercio) and IDB (Inter American development bank). These empirics 
provide evidence on the state of different Costa Rican economic features (i.e. trade 
balance, or the state of its infrastructure) that support our analysis of the impact of 
FDI in Costa Rica. 
 
In order to provide validity to this project a process of triangulation occurs, first of all, 
by working in a group we accomplish investigator triangulation, then data 
triangulation is accomplished by using different sources of data, for example, 
statistical reports, academic journals, and books in order to get the widest array of 
sources possible (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). In order to assess the reliability of 
sources, the authors will seek to cross reference sources giving our data’s “External 
Consistency” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011 pp 52).  
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1.2.3 Project Structure 
 
Costa Rica is in the overall picture of economic development in Latin America, seen 
as a success story, because of its capacity in regards to attracting high technology 
FDI to the country and diversifying its exports, something that most countries in the 
region have been unable to do. This project will explore what circumstances and 
policies have caused Costa Rica to be such a standout case in that aspect and 
whether or not that FDI actually has had a positive impact in Costa Rica. Our main 
argument in this project, is that even though Costa Rican government(s) have 
accomplished their objectives in terms of attracting FDI this is mainly due to the 
country’s stable political development which stands in sharp contrast to a lot of its 
regional neighbours and by extension its ability to invest comparatively big sums of 
money in health, education and industry. Also, after the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes were put into practice as a result of the debt crisis in the beginning of 
the 1980’s, the governments have deregulated the economy as to make it more 
attractive to FDI. Its strategy of providing big incentives for FDI has resulted in a big 
increase of growth over time and a slight increase in the current account balance, 
but attracting foreign investors via the incentives revolving around Export Processing 
Zones have not caused a significant amount of spillovers. The main problem of this 
type of regulation has been the missing tax revenues to the state from the profits that 
Transnational Corporations have made, which has given Costa Rica structural 
disadvantages regarding further industrial upgrading as funding capacity has not 
increased sufficiently. In order to argue this we have provided a project structure 
where Chapter 2 will outline this project's theoretical framework. The chapter starts 
out by giving the reader theoretical justifications for why developing countries should 
upgrade and diversify their industries. It will though, have its main focus on the 
chosen relevant heterodox theory regarding FDI in developing countries and 
introduces the reader to possible upsides and downsides regarding FDI and how 
power relations and competition are main aspects of importance. 
 
Chapter 3 serves as a background chapter providing knowledge on the Latin 
American Region in general and economic development in Costa Rica since it 
started on its Import Substitution Industrialisation strategy in the 1950’s. It also goes 
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through the period of debt and “liberalisation” of the 1980’s and especially focus on 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes and their role in shaping the Costa Rican 
economy setting up the reader for the analysis.  
 
Chapter 4 provides a review of FDI in the country and which sectors are the main 
target for foreign investors. It examines the aspects of education, political stability, 
infrastructure, and economic openness and their relevance in making Costa Rica an 
attractive host nation for high-tech FDI. 
 
Chapter 5 then moves on to examine the impact of the policies towards FDI in Costa 
Rica and to what degree FDI has facilitated the desired positive effects of linkages, 
knowledge spillovers and improved trade balance. 
 
Chapter 6 summarise the findings and discuss the implications of Costa Rica’s 
experience, that a loose approach to FDI has substantial downsides and limits a 
country’s development potential. We discuss whether or not Costa Rican 
governments had better policy options taking the global economy into consideration. 
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Chapter 2: Theory 
 
This chapter will outline and argue for the project’s theoretical framework. 
It will start out by justifying our approach to development through the ideas of Raul 
Prebisch, explaining why developing countries needs to industrialise. 
Then it will move on to explain our approach to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
which will argue for interventionist standpoint on FDI and highlight both the possible 
negative and positive effects of FDI.  
 
2.1 Theory Regarding Industrial Development 
 
The first question one has to ask her or himself when writing on interventionist 
industrial policy is the following: Why do countries need to industrialise? Is it even a 
profitable venture? To answer this question we have chosen to turn to the late 
Argentine economist Raul Prebisch and the implications of the “Prebisch-singer 
hypothesis” which he formulated with the German development economist Hans 
Singer. The hypothesis states that the relative price ratio of primary commodities and 
agricultural products compared with more sophisticated manufactured goods and 
services, with few exceptions (such as oil) and of course variations, will increase 
exponentially in the favour of manufactured goods and services (Cypher & Dietz, 
2004). The reason for this is that the so-called “income elasticity” of manufactured 
goods and services is superior to that of the primary products and agricultural 
commodities (Ibid.). 
 
That is, when income rises, consumers are more likely to increase their spending in 
the areas of manufactured goods and services than in the areas of agricultural 
products and services. So, if developing countries choose to pursue a Ricardian 
strategy based on the exports of the areas of production where they have their 
current comparative advantage (Schwartz, 2009), they will experience declining 
terms of trade (Cypher & Dietz, 2004). So, an important first theoretical standpoint 
we come into this assignment with is that a Ricardian strategy will, in general, only 
be successful in the short run and should serve as a strategy to finance further 
industrial improvement. 
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As Schwartz (2009) notes, developing countries will often have to rely on a Ricardian 
strategy in order to not be too dependent on foreign credit. Another important point to 
add here, is that developing countries will probably be most successful by building 
up a competitive advantage at a higher link in the global value chain (Schwartz, 
2009). Concluding this initial standpoint, we emphasise that developing countries 
cannot be successful at pursuing their current comparative advantage because they 
interact in a global economy where the initial conditions are skewed to favour the 
richest countries. We hereby take agreement with a general standpoint of the 
dependency theorists (see Cypher & Dietz, 2004). 
 
By not taking an “axiomatic” approach to the efficient functioning of the market 
typical of the orthodox approach, we will instead focus on the role of the government 
and its institutions as facilitators, innovators and risk-takers in the course of 
economic development. As seen in the case of the fastest-growing economy in 
recorded human history, South Korea, a state bureaucracy which defines clear goals 
for a country’s development and regulates different aspects of their economy 
according to that overall strategy, can make all the difference in the outcome of a 
country’s economic development (Cypher & Dietz, 2004). With this last notion in 
mind, we will now move on to explain our standpoint regarding Foreign Direct 
Investments as part of economic development.   
 
2.2 Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has gained increasing importance in the 
Development Economics literature, as the sheer economic impact of FDI has 
increased during the last decades of the 20th century and into the 21st (Chang, 2002). 
With neo-liberalism’s revival of neo-classical economic thought in the 80's, a positive 
view on openness of host countries towards FDI and a view of relatively unrestrained 
FDI as a net positive entered the mainstream of economic thought (Chang, 2002). 
Within the field of development economics however, the discussion has mostly 
revolved around how to most effectively regulate FDI to promote growth of local 
manufacturing industries and there is a lot of literature questioning the overall 
benefits of FDI in its current form (Cypher & Dietz, 2004). Regarding the possible 
downsides to FDI Chang (2002) lists transfer pricing, “crowding out” of local 
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producers, excessive royalty payments, monopolistic practices, retardation of local 
technological development, undue political influence, and the introduction of 
inappropriate technology as possible downsides to FDI.  
 
Looking at the often cited success stories of South Korea and Taiwan where 
regulation of FDI was high and very strategic and the relatively less successful cases 
of big NICs (Newly Industrialised Countries) such as Brazil and Mexico which has 
had a history of a more loose approach to FDI (at least in the later part of the 20th 
century-present), it becomes clear at least that a high regulation of FDI is not to the 
detriment of development. With this in mind, our approach to the study of FDI will 
focus on how it fits into the overall development strategy of a country and the abilities 
of both the host country and the transnational corporation to bargain for a beneficial 
deal. 
 
2.3 Spillovers and Industrial Upgrading 
 
As previously mentioned we take the standpoint that developing countries which 
strictly follow a Ricardian approach based on its current comparative advantage will 
over time face declining income due to the weak income elasticity within the sectors 
of raw minerals (with notable exceptions), agriculture and low-tech manufacturing as 
illustrated by Raúl Prebisch. 
 
Therefore, an important point is too see how a country is using FDI to facilitate what 
is commonly referred to as spillover effects, defined here as the absorption of more 
productive knowledge by local from foreign producers, and by extension industrial 
upgrading (Schwartz 2009; Cypher & Dietz, 2004). Spillovers then occur through 
linkages between local and foreign firms and regarding this Morrissey (2012) makes 
a distinction of three different kinds of linkages based on employment, demands of 
inputs from local suppliers and supply of inputs to local suppliers. People employed 
by the foreign investors can learn new skills which they may eventually use for 
domestic firms. Domestic firms may increase productivity when supplying to foreign 
firms and domestic firms might encounter new technology through imports and learn 
it through reverse engineering (Ibid.).  
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Schwartz (2009) illustrates how this has historically happened in the car 
manufacturing industry where US mass production and scientific management 
spread to Europe and Japan through US FDI and then later how Japanese 
management and production techniques spread to the US through Japanese FDI. A 
relatively modern example of this is the deal between GEA Alsthom and the Korean 
government regarding the financing of high-speed trains in South Korea (Financial 
Times, 94 in Chang, 2002). This deal is illustrative of the importance of technological 
spillovers of FDI, since the Korean government choose among several bidders 
where GEA Alsthom was not the one with the highest productive capabilities but 
choose them because of details in the deals that are supposed to produce spillovers 
(ibid.). This is very telling of the Korean government's very successful approach to 
development and also of how the conditions attached to FDI play a crucial role in 
shaping the positive effects from it (Cypher & Dietz, 2004).  
 
2.4 Relations between Transnational Corporations and Host Nations 
 
Since Transnational Corporations seek to rationalize their operations on a global 
scale and keep a competitive edge and since the host nation seeks long-term 
development it is, needless to say, not always a matter of shared interests between 
the Transnational Corporations and the host nation. This global rationalisation, 
where rational behaviour equals profit maximizing behaviour, puts the developing 
countries in a place of competition against one another. It is therefore crucial that the 
host nation follows a strategic FDI policy and has a bureaucracy strong enough to 
regulate and work with the relevant FDI in a way that fits the country’s overall 
development scheme. Since this requires extensive government regulation this is an 
area where the phenomenon usually referred to as “government failure” comes into 
play, but here it is crucial to remember that it is not only the degree of government 
failure, such as corruption, which is key but the type of government failure. This is 
dramatically illustrated by the difference in the impact of corruption between the 
despotic regimes of Mobutu in Zaire/Congo and Suharto in Indonesia, with the 
economic performance of Indonesia of course outshining Zaire to the nth degree 
(Chang, 2007). Analysing the relevant institutions then becomes key when analysing 
the impact of FDI. 
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Both the transnational corporation and the host country operate within an 
environment of competition. The nation because it wants to attract the transnational 
corporation in order to improve productive capability. And the transnational 
corporation, due to a product running through a natural cycle where technology 
diffuses to other firms. Transnational corporations will eventually want to invest in 
foreign markets in order to get access to that market before its competitors, the irony 
of course being that this move will eventually lead to diffusion as well (Schwartz, 
2009). An alternative motive is of course that the transnational corporations seek to 
minimise production costs and therefore are usually drawn to host nations with low 
wage levels, this is more typical of mature industries where knowledge have already 
diffused (ibid.). 
 
Therefore the states inviting the transnational corporations as part of their 
industrialisation strategy have the motive of inducing spillover effects from the 
potential superior technological capabilities of the foreign investor, and also the 
possibility of achieving a boost in exports in order to finance the investments needed 
for industrial upgrading (Cypher & Dietz, 2004; Chang, 2002). This only holds true 
though, if countries have a determined political leadership that has the will and ability 
to execute long term development strategies which incorporates FDI as dramatically 
demonstrated by countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and China. These 
countries are more of an exception than a rule though, and often countries choose 
policies that shows an almost blind trust in the benefits of FDI (Stein, 2011; Chang 
2002; 2007). The context that helps determine the outcome of negotiations between 
transnational corporations and host countries, is of course then one of the most 
interesting variables to examine. As history proves, the prospect of selling your 
product to a huge domestic market gives host countries a big advantage in the 
negotiation process as seen in the production of the “people’s car” in China (Chang, 
2002) and the automobile industry in Brazil (Schwartz, 2009). 
 
The interesting part here though is the difference in outcomes between countries that 
has the giant carrot of a big domestic market. Brazil for example is the story of a 
dramatic failure in changing the structure of exports, as the continued reliance on an 
industry dominated by Transnational Corporations during the hard import substitution 
industrialisation was not able to make Brazil competitive on the international market 
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(Schwartz, 2009). On the other hand, we see how the “East Asian miracles” 
managed to “pick winners”, and create companies of their own which became 
incredibly competitive (Chang, 2007). Though Brazil managed to spur a lot of growth 
through increased production to their domestic market, where the transnational 
corporations were a much needed source of capital investment, the strategy has it 
limits of not sufficiently modified (Schwartz, 2009). A successful FDI strategy should 
both provide an upgrade in productivity, and an increased access to foreign capital in 
order to make the next step up the global value chain (Cypher & Dietz, 2004). So 
when we look at FDI in Costa Rica, we want to draw conclusions not only about the 
current effects of FDI in high-tech manufacturing, as if we were dealing with a static 
economy, but also about how the current structure of their economy sets them up for 
future development. 
 
Another crucial aspect to examine is competition, both between transnational 
corporations operating in an oligopolistic market and the host countries. The 
transnational corporations are, or at least according to their rational self-interest,  
pursuing strategies that give them a competitive edge over other companies which 
besides the global rationalisations of their operations also include spending in 
research and development in order to invent the next new product which will 
increase consumer demand and also at the same time try to hinder the diffusion of 
the technology they possess (Schwartz, 2009). Transnational Corporations can also 
often exert considerable political influence, especially in developing countries with 
weak regulatory agencies (Schwartz, 2009; Chang, 2002). 
 
The host countries, as the world becomes more and more globalised in economic 
terms (deregulation of trade), are also in increased competition with one another. As 
countries increase or decrease their productive capabilities both in a quantitative and 
qualitative sense, which is a constant process, the competition between host 
countries change. After the end of the GATT (General agreement on tariffs and 
trade) system and the introduction of the WTO system, we now have a system 
where the differences in competitive abilities of different countries are more and 
more obvious, and to a larger degree prohibits infant industry protection behinds so-
called tariff walls. This does not mean however, that industry protection is a dead 
phenomenon as the well-functioning of every economy depends on it to a certain 
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degree (Chang, 2002). So while there is an increased pressure on developing 
countries to be competitive in the short run, countries still have a lot of room to focus 
on the long-term upgrade of their productive capabilities (Ibid.). 
 
Important aspects that determines a country’s competitiveness and ability to attract 
FDI are areas like prospects for long-term growth, political stability, quality of 
infrastructure, the effectiveness and structure of the legal system, general wage 
level, quality and education level of the workforce and, as previously mentioned, the 
possible prospect of a big domestic or regional market. These primary attractions 
can then be followed by interventionist measures both to increase or decrease 
conditionalities on FDI. The phenomenon of Export Processing Zones, is one that 
has increased dramatically in the “neo-liberal era” of world trade and one of the most 
commonly used ways for governments to attract FDI (Stein, 2011). This is also used 
in the case of FDI in Costa Rica and therefore it is an important phenomenon for us 
to study. According to Stein (2011), these zones can be used as an “experimental 
forum” where companies can learn to be more efficient and as a way to build 
relationships to companies and thus to promote further investment (Ibid.: p.9). 
 
The main thing a government wants to facilitate is then the diffusion of the superior 
practices in the Export Processing Zones and link local companies as suppliers to 
the Transnational Corporations operating in the Export Processing Zones. The 
greatest goal of them all is to build up local companies that in the long run will be 
able to compete internationally due to them having adopted the practices introduced 
by the foreign Transnational Corporations. This can be done through all kinds of 
governance created incentives, either before or after the initial investment. 
In the end, to prevent the Export Processing Zones from becoming a pure “export 
platform” these incentives needs to be in place. Thus avoiding the trap of “weak 
globalization”, where a country does not increase its overall productivity (Cypher & 
Dietz, 2004).  
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Concludingly, while FDI is an essential component of any successful development 
strategy as it can provide access to more productive technologies, add to your trade 
balance and in general provide much needed funding, it needs effective regulation in 
order for most of these possible positive features of FDI to be present to satisfactory 
degree. Depending on the economic circumstances in any given country, FDI needs 
to be regulated to suit the development needs of the country. All of this then happens 
within a global economy where varying levels of competition and prior development 
affects the negotiation tactics used by firms and countries. With this in mind, we will 
move on to the next chapter which will seek to describe the development trajectory 
of Costa Rica within the region of Latin America. 
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3. The History of Economic Development in Latin America and 
Costa Rica and How It Shapes The Reality of Today 
 
The objective of this chapter is to explain the tendencies of development in Latin 
America and understand the place of Costa Rica within a general developmental and 
historical background. We argue that Latin America as a region has certain patterns 
that are similar across the continent and that Costa Rica, although somewhat 
unique, share many similarities with the region as a whole. First, an outline of Latin 
American development will be described and secondly the patterns in Costa Rican 
development will be analyzed within that setting. 
 
3.1 Development in Latin America  
 
Latin America is a huge region, encompassing over 550 million people and 
containing countries widely different in economic, geographical and political terms. 
However, due to their shared history of being colonies controlled by either the 
Spanish or the Portuguese crowns from the early 16th century to the early 19th 
century they developed in fairly similar ways. Spain in particular led an economic 
policy which emphasized almost exclusively the export of raw goods from its 
colonies, which led to a continent wide lack of investment in industry (Cupples 2013; 
Ocampo, 2012). Furthermore, due to the caste system created by both the 
Portuguese and the Spanish, their colonies developed an incredibly high level of 
inequality, and the region is to this day the region with the highest gini coefficients 
found in the world by a pretty wide margin. In 2004 the average gini coefficient for 
the region averaged a staggering 53.2, and Latin America as such, has a solid lead 
in the race for most unequal region in the world as the runner-up is sub-Saharan 
African nations with an average Gini of 44.7 (Kingstone, 2011). Because of these 
reasons it makes sense to analyse Latin America’s general economic development 
and understand the patterns that exist in the region.  
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3.1.1 Economic situation in Latin America from the early 20th century 
With independence of most of the countries in Latin America in the 19th century the 
economic model with a focus on extraction and export of natural resources 
continued, and actually made Argentina one of the richest countries in the world in 
the 1920’s based mainly on beef and grain exports, a pretty stark contrast to today, 
as Argentina is classified as a developing country (IMF, 2014; Kingstone, 2011). 
Other countries in the region also had economic standings at the time very different 
from today, exemplified by figure 1 comparing Latin America to certain Western 
European countries. This economic model however started receiving criticism 
domestically in the early 20th century as it did not provide job opportunities for the 
new urban populations. The main problems were that the model did not provide a 
basis for the development of an internal market as investment opportunities were 
limited, nor it provided more diverse job opportunities. For instance, even a country 
as large and diverse as Brazil in 1938 had 45 % of their exports as coffee, and El 
Salvador 92 % (Kingstone, 2011 p. 25). 
  
This made the region very dependent on the prices of raw goods on the international 
market which came to show when the stock market crashed in 1929. This triggered a 
plummeting of prices on raw goods, sugar pricing for instance falling from 22.5 cents 
in 1920 to 1.5 cents in 1930, and coffee prices falling 40 % just from 1929 to 1930. 
Government revenue collapsed and this fall devastated the traditional elites in 
control of raw goods, thus triggering a challenge to the traditional liberal economic 
model and its focus on extraction of raw goods and export of such (Cupples, 2013).  
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Figure 1. Relative GDP per capita of eight Latin American Republics on Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain 1900-2008 
 
Source: Figure from Carreras, A, 2012, p. 27 
 
As the market for Latin American raw goods collapsed as a consequence of the 
plummeting demand triggered by the financial crisis and WW2, new sources of 
profits were sought by Latin American governments. Because they had a harder time 
selling their goods on international markets it also became harder for them to obtain 
the foreign capital needed to import foreign goods. Thus, the strategy outlined by 
Raúl Prebisch on Import Substitution Industrialization was adopted where the state 
identified key industrial imports flowing into the country and tried to initiate local 
initiatives to produce those goods instead. As international companies that already 
were established had expertise in the field and could produce in larger economies of 
scale it was necessary to protect domestic industries by trade barriers and other 
inducements so as to let them establish (Kingstone, 2011; Cupples, 2013). This is 
known as infant industry protection. This process began by focusing on easily 
produced industrial equipment, requiring relatively low-skilled expertise compared to 
the most advanced products of industrial production.  
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A number of State Owned Enterprises were also established as only a state-led 
effort could gather the sufficient capital needed to take on large-scale investments in, 
for instance, the extraction of minerals. 
 
An important part of this new economic paradigm was its monetary policy. As the 
goal of import substitution Industrialization in Latin America was to develop industry 
in the domestic market, latin american governments tried to lead a monetary policy 
which would facilitate this, keeping their currency strong in the international market. 
By doing this, these governments made it cheaper for domestic manufacturing 
enterprises to buy up machinery and other hardware they needed from abroad, but 
simultaneously made it more expensive for foreign countries to buy goods which 
they wished to export (Kingstone, 2011). Thus both helping manufacturing and 
simultaneously making it harder for the primary economic sector of raw minerals and 
agricultural products to compete in international markets.  
 
This was logically sound in that it helped finance the industrialization on the internal 
market, but in the end helped undermine the financing for it, as it depended on 
someone exporting goods to be able to import things needed in the new industrial 
sector in the first place. Something the industries that were industrialized did not do 
(Kingstone, 2011). Thus, a trade deficit was created which would have to be 
resolved.  
 
Therefore, many Latin American countries started depending on taking loans from 
developed countries to finance imports. However paying back interest on said loans 
depended on the countries being able to draw in foreign capital, which was now 
made very difficult as a consequence of monetary policy. Furthermore, the 
nationalist sentiment which induced Import Substitution Industrialization in the 
beginning also lead to closing the door on foreign direct investment (FDI) and thus 
getting a substantial inflow of foreign currency through the investment of foreign 
companies was not an option either. Thus, Latin American countries came under 
increasing pressure to meet their debt obligations from the 1960’s (Kingstone, 2011) 
 
What also started becoming an issue in this period was that the Latin American 
countries had focused mainly on “easy substitution”, investing in sectors that were 
  
24 
very “low-technology, labor-intensive [and produced] consumer durables that 
required little know-how and little capital to begin production” (Kingstone, 2011 p. 
33). The industrial development needed to move towards more high-tech production 
with more know-how, in order to move into industries with more value-added. 
However this did not happen. This lack of progress combined with the monetary 
policy used by Latin American countries leading to growing imbalances between 
revenues from exports and the capital needed for imports led to Transnational 
corporations beginning in the 60’s being invited back into the economy to invest 
under the same protections and subsidies granted to local producers (Kingstone, 
2011; Cypher & Dietz, 2004). 
 
This strategy worked to serve the domestic market and set up supplier links to local 
producers, but it did not manage to make Latin American firms effective producers or 
facilitate successful exports from the foreign companies (Schwartz, 2009). 
 
Another fundamental flaw in the way Import substitution industrialization was 
implemented in Latin America was the way in which there was no horizon for letting 
national industry in any way compete with international companies, due to industrial 
elites lobbying governments to keep artificially high tariffs on imports as it was in 
their own interest to keep their monopoly on the internal market (Cypher & Dietz, 
2004). Thus, they had no initiative to spend resources on innovation, nor 
fundamentally increase their productivity. Markets work through competitive 
pressures and when these pressures are not in place to lead firms to become more 
competitive, stagnation in productivity, innovation and efficiency usually occur. 
Furthermore, it is important for firms to build competitive advantages over their 
competitors, through governments investing in specific areas (Cupples, 2013).  
 
This did not happen under the paradigm of import substitution industrialization in 
Latin America, which is seen as one of the main reasons why Import Substitution 
Industrialization was not as big a success story as it was in the economies of the 
East Asian Tigers with their booming economies in the 90’s and 80’s. The Asian 
economies that implemented import substitution industrialization put in place 
measures that forced companies and State owned enterprises to export goods and 
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thus compete on the international market (Chang, 2002). This lead to some of the 
biggest success stories within developmental economics. 
 
As stated earlier one of the problems with how Import substitution industrialization 
got implemented in Latin America was that it created a negative trade balance for the 
countries implementing it, especially from the 70’s when debt-driven Import 
substitution industrialization became the norm. As such Latin American Import 
substitution industrialization was not sufficiently self-financing and continuously 
created trade deficits that the country had to make up for by taking loans abroad. 
This situation worsened further by the oil crises of the 1970’s. The 1973 hike in oil 
prices led to the Arab oil nations having lots of financial means that they were 
looking to invest, which made it easy for the Latin American countries to take up 
cheap loans and “Latin American governments embarked on spending sprees - 
payoffs to political constituencies and “pharaonic” projects - often with little 
accountability” (Kingstone, 2011 p. 44). Those loans were given with floating interest 
rates and when the world economy got plunged into financial crisis by the price hike 
in oil prices of 1979 western economies tried combating inflation by raising interest 
rates, which combined with falling demand for the exports that Latin America did 
have, sent them into financial crisis. As a result of this the IMF went in and bailed out 
virtually all Latin American countries and demanded restructuring of the economy 
through the Structural Adjustment Programmes which undermined the strategy of 
import substitution industrialization and the role state as the main leader in adjusting 
the economy (Cupples, 2013). 
 
The end of the period of Import substitution industrialization as the major economic 
paradigm in Latin America spurred a total dismissal of it as a valid economic model, 
which has later been criticised as being a too simplistic critique as there is a 
tendency in policy making to dismiss previous policies as being “all-bad” and new 
policies to be “all-good” (Weyland, 2007). Furthermore, looking at the results of 
economic development in the decades following the implementation of a neo-liberal 
economic paradigm growth has actually been slower than during the period in which 
ISI was dominating as noted by Chang (2002) and which can also be seen in table 1.  
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Table 1. GDP Growth and Volatility in Latin America in the intervals 1950-1980 and 
1990-2011 in percentages 
 
Source: Table from Ocampo, 2012 p. 16 taken from ECLAC 
 
3.1.2 Latin America after the fall of Import Substitution Industrialisation 
As most of the Latin American countries went into debt crisis in the early 80’s they 
ended up being bailed out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who as a 
condition for helping them with paying interest on their debt had certain policy 
conditions based on neoliberal principles, that the countries receiving their loans 
were obliged to put in place. These conditions were mainly targeted towards the 
lowering or abolishment of trade barriers, privatization of state owned enterprises, 
focus on exports and doing away with state subsidies (Ocampo, 2012) The 
increasing openness to trade in Latin America led to the openness of the Latin 
American economies and the European economies getting closer from the late 70’s 
as can be seen by figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Openness of Latin America vs. Western Europe, 1990-2000 in 
percentages 
 
Source: Figure from Carreras, A 2012, p. 36 
 
The sudden implementation of policies so starkly contrasted with previous economic 
policies had radical effects. Increases in poverty and unemployment, drops in real 
wages, the wipeout of local business and industries as the market was flooded with 
cheaper produced foreign goods. Even low-tech industries such as agriculture, for 
instance corn and rice, were outcompeted by cheaper goods from the US, as the US 
continued to subsidize its own agriculture while insisting on the removal of subsidies 
in Latin America. This was one of the main reasons why the 80’s in Latin America 
was dubbed the “lost decade”  and by the end of it : 
 
“Per capita incomes dropped by 10 per cent and investment fell from 23 
percent to 16 per cent of national income.. [and] nearly one third of the 
region’s population was living in poverty by 1990, up from 27 per cent a 
decade earlier” (Cupples, 2013 p. 60) 
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The restructuring and reform that was implemented in this period also had a big 
effect on the manufacturing industry as its share of GDP in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico fell from 31 percent, 35 percent and 26 percent to 17 percent, 21 percent, 
and 19 percent respectively from 1980 to 2001 (Kingstone, 2011). The massive 
bailout packages and the consequences of the policies put in place by the IMF didn’t 
ultimately cut down their debt though, by 2000 the region as a whole owed US$750 
billion which was actually up from US$191 billion in 1981 (Cupples, 2013). 
 
The magnitude of the change in policies can be seen by table 2, a structural reform 
index developed by The Inter American Development Bank outlining the amount of 
influence the government has on controlling the economy with a value of zero 
indicating complete control and a value of one indicating complete laissez-faire. As 
outlined, the value of every country in the region tipped towards more free market 
policies quite significantly.  
 
Table 2. Structural reform index in Latin America, 1985-1999 
 
Source: Table from Kingstone, (2011), p. 72  
 
The outcomes across the region ended being fairly mixed however, with some 
regions doing better than others under this new paradigm. Big gains were made in 
terms of how the governments managed budgetary and monetary policy, as inflation 
in general came under control in the region. However there were still cases of 
currency crises, as witnessed by the 1994 Mexican Peso crisis, the 1999 Brazilian 
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Real crisis and the 2001 Argentine peso crisis (Kingstone, 2011). One problem 
however exacerbated by the introduction of neoliberalism into the region was 
increased inequality. The new paradigm of free market policies benefited the elites 
with higher education way more than it benefited lower classes, as job prospects in 
both low tech manufacturing and agriculture came under pressure.  
 
As the 1990’s rolled around and the gains promised by neoliberals failed to manifest 
themselves, explanatory factors were sought. One of the main explanations argued 
by the IMF to be responsible for the lack of economic growth was that the legislation 
surrounding the labor market was not reformed sufficiently. According to the IMF, it 
was still too hard for businesses to hire and fire workers in order to increase their 
productivity, which resulted in inefficiency within the market. Thus, there was an 
increase in turnover rates over the course of the 90’s which also increased the 
percentage of the population working in the informal sector (Kingstone, 2011; 
Cupples 2013). In addition, skyrocketing crime rates contributed to a problem 
already endemic to the region. Latin America as a region as of now leads the world 
in murder rates, as 34 out of the top 50 and the entire top 10 of the world's most 
violent cities are in the region, and an impressive one third of global murders are 
committed there (Engel & Sterbenz, 2014) 
 
As local manufacturing declined as a consequence of increased ”openness” to 
foreign manufacturing a somewhat renewed dependence on exports of basic goods 
came about, which made the financial crisis of the late 90’s hit Latin America hard. 
Although the IMF and others argued that labor reforms had been insufficient to gain 
the full profits from neoliberalism the lack of improvement in meaningful socio-
economic factors led the latin american population to turn against neoliberalism by 
the beginning of the new millennium. Thus by 2009 half the countries in Latin 
America had voted in left wing presidents, and the presidents of Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Honduras and Nicaragua had allied with Hugo Chavez in creating the ALBA - the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, an organization established by 
Cuba and Venezuela to consolidate regional economic development among socialist 
democracies (Ocampo, 2012). 
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Argentina, Venezuela and Bolivia also moved to re-nationalize key sectors, 
renegotiated agreements with firms allowed to extract natural resources and 
reintroduced significant regulations and restrictions in the market (Kingstone, 2011) 
Although in spite of this the swing away from neoliberal policies did not lead to a 
reintroduction of Import substitution industrialization nor did it lead to the region 
generally becoming specifically anti-market, but instead spawned approach more 
open to working with more mixed policies (Cupples, 2013; Caldentey & Titelman, 
2014) 
 
However the neoliberal policies introduced did not only have negative consequences 
for the region, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Monetary and fiscal policy 
were improved, for instance witnessed by how Latin America was well equipped to 
handle the latest financial crisis of 2008, having made ample savings before the 
crisis to employ Keynesian policies to prevent their economies from going into 
recession (Kingstone, 2011; Caldentey & Titelman, 2014; Kacef & López-Monti 
2010) Even though foreign debt in 2000 was a lot higher than it was in 1981, external 
debt in the region has since gone down significantly (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 . Latin America external debt 1998-2011 as a percentage of GDP at 
2000 exchange rates 
 
Source: Figure from Ocampo, 2012 p. 23 
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Another factor that has had growing importance in the 21st century has been the 
implementation of a more integrated system to facilitate private-public sector 
cooperation, national development banks for instance providing funds to private 
projects and national development agencies that try and bring foreign investment 
into the country, and also putting focus on how that investment can have nationwide 
benefits through use of technology diffusion strategies (Kingstone, 2011). But the 
success of this focus remains to be seen. 
 
3.1.3 Contemporary Issues 
Thus, the radical changes in determining which economic paradigm to apply in Latin 
America over the past 35 years has left the region in a place where it is actually quite 
diversified. From the extreme left in Venezuela, peronist Argentina, somewhat mixed 
Brazil and still extremely neoliberal Chile there is now a higher degree of 
intermingling policies compared to previous times. Although Neoliberalism has not 
lived up to its promises for delivering a massive wave of renewed growth to the 
region there is hope that a more pragmatic approach to developmental policies can 
benefit the region, as seen for instance by the adept management of the most recent 
financial crisis.  
 
Figuring out a way of producing policies that will secure stable and continuous 
economic development and improve the institutions of the region is paramount, 
especially if it is to solve the endemic problems in the region: inequality, violence, 
unemployment and instability. Therefore, the next part of this chapter will analyse 
how these different dynamics have played out in Costa Rica over the course of the 
past half-century. 
 
3.2 The curious case of Costa Rica 
This part of the chapter will specifically examine the economic history of Costa Rica 
from the establishment of the 2nd republic of 1948 to the period after the debt crisis 
of the 1980’s, in order to give the reader background knowledge as to the structure 
and recent history of the Costa Rican economy and the impact it has had on their 
FDI attraction strategies.   
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Compared to the rest of Latin America, Costa Rica has for a long time been a 
curious case. While many other nations in the region are still primarily exporting 
natural resources and primary commodities, the small republic of Costa Rica has 
developed a high-tech industrial sector and has moved up the global supply chain as 
illustrated in tables 3 and 4. Costa Rica has also not only been a continuous stable 
democracy from 1949 until now, the longest uninterrupted stretch for any Latin 
American country (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007), it has also voluntarily abolished its armed 
forces and has had an extensive welfare system and social security in place since 
the early 1940’s (Nelson, 1984).   
 
Table 3. Exports from Latin America (without Mexico), percentage of total exports of 
goods, 1987-2005 
 
Source: Table from Sánchez-Ancochea, 2009, p. 66 
 
Table 4. Exports from Costa Rica, percentage of total exports of goods, 1987-2005 
 
Source: Table from Sánchez-Ancochea, 2009, p. 67 
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The Costa Rican road to its special status started immediately after the civil war in 
1948. José Figueres, established the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) to represent 
the victorious side of the civil war in the democratic political climate of Costa Rica. 
The PLN would focus on development and redistribution and would remain the 
leading political force throughout the pre 1980's years of Costa Rican economic 
history (Ramos et al., 2014). Starting out with a modernisation programme aimed at 
increasing the production and quality of native Costa Rican agricultural products, 
primarily coffee, and to bring it up to modern standards through supporting the use of 
fertilizers and improving production efficiency. This was followed by the Industrial 
Protection Law of 1959, which signalled the beginning of Import Substitution 
Industrialization in Costa Rica, through higher tariffs on the import of manufactured 
products and subsidies to native industries (Ramos et al., 2014).  
 
While the PLN expanded the native industries of Costa Rica, it also initiated an 
expansion of the state. This expansion contributed to driving the development of the 
Costa Rican economy. For example, the PLN expanded the national electricity 
industry to outcompete U.S. firms that were able to set their own prices on energy, 
driving prices up. The expansion of electrical output fuelled the urbanization of the 
Costa Rican cities, bringing more people to live closer to factories and industries 
starting up (Rankin, 2012). Through the expansion and creation of public companies 
in areas such as energy, communications and social security, the state went from 
employing 6% of the population in 1950 to 18% in 1980 and increased the social 
security coverage of the urban population from covering 8% of the population in 
1950 to 70% in 1980 (Ramos et al., 2014, p. 369). These improvements in both state 
employment and social security also resulted in more public support for the state, as 
workers now found themselves more dependent on public companies instead of 
large U.S. ones such as the United Fruit Company, that originally provided work and 
social security for the people. (Rankin, 2012)  
 
However, there was a problem in promoting industrial growth, as Costa Rica had 
neither the natural resources nor the industrial base to compete and undertake 
industrial upgrading. To solve the natural resource problem, the Costa Rican 
government decided in 1962 to join the then 2-year old Central American Common 
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Market (CACM). The CACM was a U.S. politically backed Export Processing Zone 
intended to pool resources and foster the creation of regional firms that could 
compete with foreign ones. (Rankin, 2012). However, Costa Rica’s entry into the 
CACM did not yield the benefits the government and businesses had hoped, as even 
within the export processing zone Costa Rican industries were not competitive 
enough to compete with the, at that point, richer countries in the CACM (Rankin, 
2012). It also quickly led to a dependency on importing resources for the growing 
Costa Rican manufacturing industry, instead of developing their own supply 
industries (Nelson, 1984). The initial growth spurt of the early Import substitution 
industrialization years with the CACM access to raw materials slowly declined in the 
years leading up to the debt crisis as shown by figure 4. Nelson (1984) blames the 
decline in growth on the Costa Rican focus to export primarily to the CACM instead 
of other foreign markets, and with the region still poor, there was not enough capital 
amongst the general population to fuel further industrial growth after initial market 
demands were met (Nelson, 1984; Rankin, 2012). 
 
Figure 4. Average Manufacturing Production Growth Rate in Costa Rica in the 
intervals 1961-72, 1973-76 and 1977-79. 
 
Source: Graph created by the authors with statistics from Nelson, 1984, p. 156 
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With the failure of the CACM to provide growth, the Costa Rican government 
focused on establishing Costa Rican exports in foreign markets outside the Latin 
American region. Import substitution industrialization was not having the intended 
effect due to Transnational Corporations establishing themselves in the Costa Rican 
market through the CACM, and the money the Transnational Corporations used to 
invest in native Costa Rican supply firms did often not make its way back into the 
Costa Rican market. To counteract the effect of the Transnational Corporations the 
Costa Rican government established the Corporación Costarricense de Desarrollo 
(CODESA), the Costa Rican Development Corporation. The intention was for new 
native industries to use CODESA for support until they had the ability to stand on 
their own (Rankin, 2012). In reality, however, CODESA would often end up providing 
all the investment funds on their own, as such, supporting unproductive businesses 
and as a result, government spending increased. CODESA has been generally 
noted as unprofitable by several authors (Nelson, 1984; Rankin, 2012) and it not only 
failed to promote industrial development, it also helped fuel the lending sprees of the 
1970’s Costa Rican governments, helping setting the country up for failure in the 
coming debt crisis. Tax revenues did not keep up with government expenses, as 
there was no political will to raise taxes with the danger of losing support from the 
public. The result being that from 1970 to 1978, foreign debt in Costa Rica grew from 
$164 million to more than $1 billion (Jiménez & Palmer, 1998 cited in Rankin, 2012, 
p. 137). 
 
When the debt crisis hit Latin America, as described earlier in this chapter, it did not 
spare Costa Rica. The heavy spending of the ISI years, the sudden loss of some of 
its export markets in neighbouring Central America due to political conflicts and 
instability, and the sudden drop of coffee prices lead to a situation where Costa 
Rican exports could no longer keep up with the large debt looming over the state, 
and in 1981 Costa Rica defaulted on its loans. (Hansen-Kuhn 1993; Rankin 2012; 
Ramos et al., 2014). Inflation rose sharply, GDP growth turned negative and wages 
fell. In a response to these problem, Costa Rica turned to the IMF and World Bank 
for financing. 
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Table 5. Costa Rican Economic Indicators, 1978-1992. 
  
Source: Table from Clark, 1997, p. 78 
 
The solution decided on by the World Bank and IMF was to bail out Costa Rica with 
foreign exchange through Structural Adjustment Loans, as they would later offer to 
the rest of the region. In return for those loans, Costa Rican governments would 
have to reform their economy with Structural Adjustment Programmes that would 
promote the opening of markets and cut back on state spending (Rankin, 2012). The 
first of these loans, signed in 1985, would start that process. Reducing tariffs on 
competing final goods from the range of 40-220% to 35-70% (World Bank, 1994, p. 
8). This marked the end of import substitution industrialization in Costa Rica, as the 
market now opened up to the competition of foreign manufactured goods before 
being ready for it. Through further steps like the reduction in government spending 
and the privatisation of public firms, such as CODESA, the heavy hand that the 
Costa Rican governments usually had in their economic affairs was removed 
(Hansen-Kuhn, 1993). 
 
Structural Adjustment Loan II, the second programme, further decreased tariffs to an 
allowed range of 5-40%, except for some goods that were allowed to stray from this 
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range like some non-competing manufactures (medicine) and some luxury items 
(World Bank, 1994, p. 20). It also further expanded the cut of public expenditure 
initiated by Structural Adjustment Loan I by now targeting the Social Security and 
further promote the diversification of the Costa Rican economy through promoting 
non-traditional exports (Hansen-Kuhn, 1993; Ramos et al., 2014).  
 
The final programme, Structural Adjustment Loan III, was approved in 1995 and 
focused primarily on reforming the large Costa Rican public sector, which in the mind 
of the World Bank, had carried a large responsibility for creating the account deficit in 
the first place (Ramos et al., 2014). The programme was not carried out fully, as 
there was a switch in the administration of Costa Rica between the signing and 
implementation of the programme. A reduction in the public sector did take place 
however, but it was unclear to the World Bank whether it was sufficient and so the 
programme was terminated (World Bank, 1996). 
 
Other than the loans received from the World Bank through the Structural 
Adjustment Loans, the debt crisis saw Costa Rica receive foreign capital and 
investments from another angle, namely directly from the U.S. itself. The United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) played a large role in directing 
economic assistance funds to Costa Rica that spiked during the debt crisis. Between 
1946 and 1981, U.S. aid to Costa Rica numbered $198 Million in total while from 
1982-1990 that figure skyrocketed to $1.3 Billion (See table 6). This funding provided 
USAID with a clear presence in Costa Rica that was further cemented when USAID, 
in cooperation with Costa Rican private businesses, started the Coalición 
Costarricense de Iniciativas de Desarrollo (CINDE), the Costa Rican Coalition of 
Development Initiatives and investment promotion agency (Rankin, 2012). 
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Table 6. U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance to Costa Rica, 1982-1995, in 
Millions of U.S. Dollars 
 
Source: Table from Clark, 1997, p. 83. 
 
CINDE followed up on the Structural adjustment loans as a new tradition where the 
Costa Rican government would no longer be completely in control of its own 
industries. Other than creating CINDE, USAID also paid for the creation of an export 
ministry that would assist CINDE in seeking export opportunities. This led to a 
situation where it was CINDE, and not the government, who led the charge in 
attracting foreign investments into manufacturing export industries during the 1990’s 
(Clark, 1997).  
 
From this historical perspective, it can be seen that the modern Costa Rican 
economic focus on non-traditional exports and attracting FDI stems from the 
problems that occurred when import substitution industrialization failed and the 
World Bank imposed the structural adjustment programmes on the country. The 
Costa Rican governments’ less protectionist focus stems from the adjustments 
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imposed on it through not only the Structural adjustment loans, but also the USAID 
that guided Costa Rica into a more free market approach. This development set 
Costa Rica up for the attraction of Transnational Corporations and FDI that occurred 
throughout the 90’s. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
Looking at the economic development of Costa Rica as compared to the rest of Latin 
America it becomes clear that they share a significant amount of history. Especially 
the shared history of pursuing a debt-driven Import substitution industrialization 
leading to the debt-crisis of the 1980’s and then followed by the initiation of the 
structural adjustment programmes is an important shared aspect, which has a lot to 
do with why Costa Rica came to lead a strategy focused on FDI. 
 
Costa Rica’s main diversion from the rest of the region is its history of political 
stability throughout the latter half of the 20th century continuing until the present, a 
very noticeable difference especially when compared to its nearest neighbours. This 
stability has undoubtedly left them with some competitive advantages over some of 
their regional neighbours and is an important aspect of their success. From this 
notion, we will go into depth with the specifics of FDI in Costa Rica during the last 
two decades. 
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4. Foreign Direct Investment in Costa Rica 
 
After having outlined and discussed key areas leading up to the spike in FDI Costa 
Rica experienced in the 90’s, we will now look at the specifics of the developments in 
high technology FDI. We will start by introducing the basic elements of FDI in Costa 
Rica to give a basic understanding of the grand empirical lines. Then, due to its 
significance in the global value chain and its potential for industrial upgrading 
through spillovers and linkages, we are going to dedicate this chapter to the factors 
that attracted FDI in the high-tech manufacturing sector in Costa Rica. In doing so, 
we will look into investments made by the Costa Rican governments in the areas of 
education and infrastructure, and then consider the factors of political stability and 
openness towards FDI by looking at some of the political strategies pursued in 
attracting FDI from the 1990’s-present, and the decrease in protectionist measures in 
the global economy in general. 
 
We will argue that Costa Rica’s success in attracting high-tech FDI was not the 
product of any well designed development strategy, but rather a combination of past 
efforts in education during the Import substitution industrialization period, political 
stability and well functioning institutions, an open approach to FDI, combined with 
global economic circumstances that have setup Costa Rica for this development 
 
4.1 Overview of FDI in Costa Rica 
As the Costa Rican governments gradually reduced restrictions on foreign 
investment and tariffs on exports beginning in the 80’s, the Amount of FDI flowing 
into Costa Rica rose heavily during the 1990’s and took an interesting turn in 1996 
as the electronics giant Intel made an initial investment of around $300 million (Paus, 
2005).  Net FDI inflows in Costa Rica are illustrated in figure 5. Here we can see that 
the trend which began in the 90’s has continued into the 21st century with stable 
growth rates, though we also see some annual fluctuation caused by the “IT-crisis” in 
the late 90’s (Paus, 2005) and a decrease in FDI during the financial crisis.  
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Figure 5. Annual Growth in percentages and FDI inflows in Millions of U.S. Dollars in 
Costa Rica 1980-2012. 
 
 
Source: Figure made by the authors with numbers from the website of Ministerio de Comercio Exterior 
de Costa Rica (Comex, Nd.) [online] , accessed 16-05-15 at: 
http://datosabiertos.comex.go.cr/visualizations/9149/costa-rica-inversion-extranjera-directa-recibida/ 
 
 
The chart shows annual growth in percentage in the orange bars and the annual 
inflows in millions of US$ by the blue line. Now in order to understand the qualitative 
composition of Costa Rica’s increase in FDI inflows we need to look at statistics 
showing the composition of FDI inflows by sector. As outlined in the problem area, 
Costa Rica has attracted significant amounts of FDI in the high-tech manufacturing 
sector and the noticeable increase in FDI inflows since 1996 has in large part been 
due to this sector, but also very noticeable inflows in the tourism and real estate 
sectors are worth mentioning. These developments are described in Table 7. 
While table 7 only illustrates the manufacturing sector as a whole which is the sector 
with the biggest FDI inflows until 2005, it is important to remark that out of the 
manufacturing FDI, the biggest part is directed towards high tech manufacturing (in 
the case of Costa Rica constituted mainly by the semiconductor and electronics 
industries), as shown by the high percentage of the exports that are in high tech 
manufacturing (Sánchez-Ancochea, 2009, p. 67) as shown in table 4 of this project.  
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Table 7. Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment by sector in Costa Rica 1997-2013, in Millions 
of U.S. Dollars 
 
 
Source: Table made by the authors with numbers from the website of Ministerio de Comercio Exterior 
de Costa Rica (COMEX, ND.), accessed 16-05-15 at: 
http://datosabiertos.comex.go.cr/datastreams/89097/inversion-extranjera-por-sectores-de-destino-
economico/. Stats on years 1997-1999 taken from Paus, 2005 
 
 
After describing the overall conditions of FDI in Costa Rica we will now move on to 
introducing the reader to the aforementioned aspects of government that played a 
role in attracting high technology FDI starting with education and followed by 
infrastructure and political stability. 
 
Costa Rican governments had from the nineteenth century invested a substantial 
part of the revenues generated from tariffs into an extensive primary school system, 
resulting in a generalized primary education ahead of most other Latin American 
countries (Funkhouser, 1998) From the 40’s a large amount of investments were 
also made in social spending, which drastically improved the HDI of Costa Rica, 
however it did not ultimately result in a substantial upgrading in terms of the 
productive capabilities of the economy (Sanchez-Ancochea 2009).  
 
One of the core factors that set up Costa Rica for developing its economy and 
industrialize came about in especially the 70’s from the expansion of the tertiary 
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education system. The number of people attending university in the country had 
been very low previously, but from 1972 to 1984 the number increased from 17.645 
to 141.483 persons (Funkhouser, 1998). This process however started in the 50’s 
when public spending on education started increasing from 1.5 per cent in 1950 to 
6.2 per cent in 1980. By 1970 Costa Rica was dedicating more resources towards 
education than any other country in the region, as can be seen table 8.  
 
 
Table 8. Selected Latin American countries: public spending in education, 1970-99, 
in percentage of GDP. 
 
Source: Table from Sanchez-Ancochea, 2009, p. 74 
 
 
This grand investment in the education of the Costa Rican labor force was core to 
achieving the upgrade in the educational capabilities of the population seen below, 
with other programs that provided grants and loans to students with lesser means 
contributing as well (Paus, 2005).  
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Table 9. Costa Rican labour force by educational level, 1976 and 2008 
 
Source: Table from Villalobos & Monge-González, 2011 p. 3 
 
These investments in education are argued as being central to the choice of Intel to 
invest in Costa Rica. (Paus, 2005; Villalobos & Monge-González, 2011). At the time 
of the investment Intel also brokered a deal with the government as a precondition 
for their investment which guaranteed that Costa Rica would spend at least 6% of 
their GDP on education, and further put more emphasis on computer skills and 
language skills (English) in the educational system (Schuler & Brown, 1999) The 
ability of Intel to dictate this shows the lack of leverage that the government of Costa 
Rica has when negotiating with foreign companies. This initiative was further 
expanded by the ministry of education in their 2001 programme called “The National 
Integrated Technical Education for Competitiveness” (SINETEC) that focused on 
training of new technical skills and creating technical capacities that are required by 
foreign high-tech companies. (Monge-González, 2010)  
 
However it remains a challenge for Costa Rica to keep investments in education up, 
particularly in sciences as there have been concerns that engineers in a sufficiently 
wide number of areas have been lacking. If Costa Rica wants to keep attracting high-
tech FDI it will have to take this concern seriously, as the percentage of students in 
tertiary education that study sciences is only at 18% of the student body. This 
compares quite unfavorably with for instance Argentina at 30% and Chile at 43% 
(Paus, 2005). It is as such argued that it will be hard for Costa Rica to absorb 
increasing quantities of high-tech FDI as it doesn’t have the necessary workforce to 
administer it. (Paus, 2005) 
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The gains made in the social system of Costa Rica and in the health system also 
contributed to making its human capital attractive to FDI. While Costa Rican wages 
are relatively high compared to countries with which it might compete for high-tech 
investments, mainly its Asian competitors, the workforce is considered to be more 
productive, as highlighted by its ranking in the Global Competitiveness Report which 
ranked Costa Rica as number 1 in 2001 and number 3 in 2014 within the Latin 
American region with regards to the “quality of its environment for innovation, the 
capability to receive international technology and export goods with technological 
content, and the degree of assimilation of new information and telecommunications 
technologies” (World Economic Forum, 2014; Mirchandani & Condo, 2005).  
 
Furthermore this has been shown by the interviews of Eva Paus (2005) with 
managers of high-tech Transnational Corporations facilities in Costa Rica where 
many of them stress that the training periods they had planned for developing new 
skills usually were shorter than expected, and that the workers acquired the skills 
and knowledge necessary in way less time than originally expected. Other managers 
also state explicitly that the higher productivity in Costa Rica compensated for the 
fact that wages were higher compared to facilities in South East Asia.1 (Paus, 2005) 
 
4.1.1 Infrastructure In Costa Rica 
According to Castro & Porras (2009) a general evaluation of the Costa Rican 
infrastructure is that it presents great variations in quality. In some areas, it is as 
competitive as developed countries, while in others there is still a lot of key 
investments to be made in order to compete at an international level. This is due 
mainly to the lack of priority given to infrastructure in the political agenda and the 
lack of government capacity to invest more due to budgetary constraints. Therefore, 
although we can argue that infrastructure played a role in attracting FDI, the lack of 
development in later years could create difficulties for further development. We 
argue for this by drawing on examples from the electricity, water and transport 
infrastructure in Costa Rica. 
 
One of the examples of this inequality in infrastructure that Castro & Porras (2009) 
talk about, is that of provision of water. 98% of the population has access to clean 
                                               
1 Neither sample size nor the relative amount of managers stating this are stated in the source. 
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water, but only 3.5% of the water grid counts with proper sewers and active residual 
water processing plants. Other examples could be the electricity sector where 98% 
of the population again has access to electricity (and 93% of that electricity is 
renewable). At the same time though, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad 
(ICE) has had trouble in materializing new projects to upgrade the electric grid in 
Costa Rica, leading to electricity cuts and higher costs for electricity (Castro & Porras 
2009). 
 
Table 10. Comparison of Infrastructure and quality of services in selected countries.  
 
Legend (In english): From left to right the features compared are: Quality of roads, Quality of ports, 
Quality of airports, Quality of electricity, fixed telephone grid, mobile phones services, Internet 
services, Broadband internet services. 
Source: Castro & Porras comparison based on data from the global competitiveness report 2008 in 
Castro R. & Porras J.A. (2009) p.146  
 
In table 10 we can see that Costa Rica compares unfavourably in the area of 
Infrastructure compared to other countries. Attention should be made to the quality of 
roads and ports, and the low amount of mobile phones and broad range internet (as 
of 2008). Furthermore, the time to connect to the different grids of water, electricity 
and telephone is high. For example, in order to be provided with a telephone line in 
Costa Rica waiting time is more than 3 months, in comparison, the waiting time is 
11,3 times lower in Panamá (Castro & Porras 2009), this example signifies that the 
time required to start businesses in Costa Rica is high. 
 
Therefore, although there has been progress in some aspects like in the coverage of 
electricity and water, other strategic investments did not match the economic and 
demographic growth (Castro & Porras, 2009). 
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The main reason for Costa Rica being unable to invest more in infrastructure is 
mainly the macroeconomic crisis in the 80’s where public investment in infrastructure 
decreased (Fay & Morrison, 2005 in Castro & Porras, 2009). More specifically in 
Costa Rica, in order to meet IMF and World Bank demands, cuts in public 
investment were made, as an example the percentage of national budget in transport 
infrastructure went from above 13% before the Structural adjustment program to 
between 3-4%. (ACCR, 2006 in Castro & Porras, 2009). 
After the Structural Adjustment programs, there has been a lack of investment in 
infrastructure, due mainly to the lack of government capacity but also because of the 
decision from the Costa Rican government to spend more in health and education 
than in infrastructure as shown in figure 6 (Castro & Porras, 2009). 
 
Figure 6. Public Investment as percentage of GDP in Costa Rica. 1991-2007 
 
Source: Castro R. & Porras J.A. with data from the ministry of planification and political economy 
(2009) p. 151 
 
In spite of the problems mentioned above, the role of infrastructure in the 
development of Costa Rica should not be underestimated, since the export oriented 
model would not have worked without an infrastructure base From the 80’s to the 
present. Moreover, the Inter American Development Bank has invested 1.2 billion $ 
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in extending electricity to every part of the country so Costa Rica's infrastructure in 
this regard was ahead of most other Latin American countries from this point.  
 
Furthermore, the Costa Rican government has been very forthcoming in terms of 
meeting the demands of the foreign firms that come to invest with regards to their 
requirements in infrastructure. For instance building a special electricity substation 
for Intel (though with funds advanced by the company), building separate roads to 
and from their plant and building a new airport in San José. However, these 
initiatives in infrastructure have come under critique as the preferential treatment of 
foreign firms in the Export Processing Zone make it very difficult for national firms to 
become competitive, as they do not have the same infrastructure available to them. 
In addition, the viability of further investments in infrastructure in Costa Rica has 
been questioned as one of the main pull effects Costa Rica used to attract FDI is that 
they don’t have to pay very high taxes, which then limits the government's ability to 
further expand and maintain infrastructure (Paus, 2005). Therefore the infrastructure 
base that attracted FDI seems to come more from investments made before the 
structural adjustments programs and liberalization periods, since the Costa Rican 
government has not had the capacity to invest too much in infrastructure ever since 
(but only in specific situations). But in order to keep the actual development model 
new investments in infrastructure need to be made so more FDI can be attracted and 
other sectors can also benefit, like the tourism sector. 
 
 
4.1.2 Political Stability and Institutions 
  
One of the main benefits which Costa Rica had as opposed to its competitors, and 
that also was one of the key requirements Intel had, was political stability. As stated 
earlier Costa Rica has not experienced bloody civil wars since 1948 as opposed to 
many of their regional neighbors, a clear indication of this is the fact that Costa Rica 
had not had an army since 1948, one year before the Costa Rican democratic 
system became a reality. Something else that reflects stability is that there is a well-
functioning political system, where ideological differences between the two parties 
does not cause major conflict or disagreement (Spar, 1998). Furthermore to 
ideological differences between the political parties in Costa Rica about working with 
CINDE as well as with the business community did not play a major part (Nelson, 
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2005). The lack of strong regional politics also went a long way in contributing to 
national unity and stability. When Costa Rica passed the Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) in a 2004 referendum by a 
narrow margin, only 52% for, there was a national backlash. But that backlash 
manifested itself in national debates and national political opposition, leaving Costa 
Rica still stable (Rankin, 2012). Comparatively, when NAFTA was passed in Mexico 
in 1994, there was an armed regional backlash when “Zapatista” rebels rose up in 
the southern province of Chiapas, leaving to nation-wide unrest and questions of 
lack of legitimacy on the part of the Mexican government (Keen & Haynes, 2000). 
 
This stability both in administration and society in Costa Rica was widely different 
from the rest of the region. Following World War 2 until the conclusion of the cold 
war, and some places well after, many Latin American countries went through 
several rounds of civil wars, military coups, reprisal attacks and persecutions (Keen 
& Haynes, 2000). 
  
Close to Costa Rica, Central America was a battleground between both communist 
and syndicalist insurrectionaries and guerrillas against reactionary army elements. 
These reactionary forces received U.S. aid that not only allowed them to arm 
themselves to fight the guerrillas, but also to fund public projects that would keep 
them in power after coups and civil wars (Keen & Haynes, 2000). That U.S. aid, 
then, did not go into developing industries or attracting FDI. The high uncertainty in 
the region over who held legitimate power, and for how long they would was 
detrimental to relationship between host countries and transnational corporations. 
These conflicts eventually hurt the trade in the Central American Common Market, 
for example, when El Salvador and Honduras went to war in 1969 or the Nicaraguan 
Civil War from 1960 to 1990 (Keen & Haynes, 2000). Displacement of peoples and 
expensive wars reduced the export basis and the market demand for manufactured 
goods, which was detrimental to the industrialisation of the region as a whole. 
 
Even the bigger countries, which were and still are the primary competitors to Costa 
Rica’s attraction of FDI, saw many violent struggles that hurt their capabilities to 
attract investments. In places like Brazil and Chile, even democratising the military 
Juntas of the cold war, was done under the watchful eye of the military and the threat 
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of another reactionary coup was present for some time after the countries had 
become democratic (Keen & Haynes, 2000). Therefore the fact that in comparison 
Costa Rica can be seen as a much more stable state has helped gain more FDI that 
the other countries in the region. 
 
As seen in these sections different factors within the fields of education, 
infrastructure and political stability make the business environment in Costa Rica 
favourable to FDI. In this sense, these three factors provide for a base for the 
attraction of investment. In the next section we will look more specifically at how the 
government of Costa Rica followed an open approach to FDI, to further incentivise 
the attraction of FDI. 
 
4.2. Investment Policy in Costa Rica 
 
In order to further attract investment Costa Rican governments have maintained a 
policy of economic openness and of incentives (mainly in the form of tax exemptions) 
that has made the country interesting for businesses seeking to benefit from those 
initiatives. In this section, an overview of these policies, frameworks and incentives 
will be given and, in the end, an assessment of these policies will be included. 
 
4.2.1 Openness of Costa Rica towards investment 
 
Since being a candidate for joining the OECD in 2013, Costa Rica has been 
attached to the OECD’s National Treatment Framework, which is a framework that 
does not allow the state of Costa Rica to treat national and international investors 
differently. However, this framework does allow for exceptions to national treatment, 
to achieve this Costa Rican governments have to make a request to the OECD. In 
the case of Costa Rica, the sectors with exceptions are the Energy sector, the 
mining sector and geological explorations (except hydrocarbons) and the Transport 
sector. (OECD, 2013 P. 60-63). 
 
According to the government of Costa Rica, the reasoning behind these exemptions 
is to ensure harmonization and equilibrium by keeping key sectors under control, 
which ensure the population of Costa Rica access to these key commodities at 
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reasonable prices not totally controlled by market forces (OECD, 2013 p. 68). At the 
same time an assurance of quality and reliability is needed while promoting local 
development projects and investments (ibid. p. 68). 
 
Therefore, in Costa Rica, the following activities are subject to public monopolies: 
 
·         “Exploration and exploitation of geothermal activities; 
·         Import, refinery and wholesale distribution of crude oil and its derivatives; 
·         Production and marketing of ethylic alcohol for the elaboration of alcoholic 
beverages; 
·         Water supply and public sewage services; 
·         Social service of postal communication of letter classified as letters and 
cards (LC) according to the Universal Postal Union; 
·         Lottery sale services; 
·         Electricity transmission; and 
·         Basic traditional telephony (fixed telecommunications)”. (OECD, 2013 pp 67-68) 
 
Investments in the following sectors are subject to concessions from state monopoly: 
 
·         “Railroad, road and maritime transport services; 
·         Marinas, docking facilities and airport services; 
·         Radio and television broadcasting services; 
·         Wireless services; 
·         Electricity generation, distribution and commercialisation; 
·         Mining and hydrocarbons exploration; 
·         Irrigation services; 
·         Maritime and air services in national ports; and 
·         Collection and treatment services of industrial and solid waste”. (OECD, 2013 pp. 
67-68) 
 
Although restriction are in place in sectors as indicated, recent developments have 
moved the government towards more liberalization in the restricted sectors. Already, 
with the introduction of the CAFTA-DR free trade agreement, Costa Rica had to 
liberalize both the insurances sector and the telecommunications sector. At the same 
time, the government started the process of privatising the energy sector (OECD, 
2013 p 70). According to the 2011-2014 National development plan, Private 
investment is central to the development plans done by the government of Costa 
Rica (Midelplan, 2010). This fits with the general tendency that the government of 
Costa Rica wants to further the liberalization process in future years, even though as 
of right now Costa Rica is already considered highly open to investment, both in 
general and per sectors (see figure 7). 
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Figure 7. OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, as of December 2012 
 
Source: OECD, 2013 p. 72 
 
 
In addition, Costa Rica has signed and enforced bilateral investment agreements 
with 13 countries and free trade agreements (which includes investments sections) 
with another 10 countries (OECD, 2013 p 97). These bilateral agreements provide 
further protection of the investments coming from those countries, while at the same 
time free trade agreements normally attach more liberalizing implications to the 
countries. As shown above Costa Rica is highly open to investment. In addition, 
more specific policies are pursued to incentivize investment in the country. 
 
There is no specific law on investment in Costa Rica, but the commercial code of law 
of Costa Rica is the one regulating both private and international investment. There 
has not been considerations by the Costa Rican government as to the usefulness of 
an actual investment legislation to regulate investment, but legislation that is more 
sectorial has been passed in order to create incentives regimes in order to attract the 
targeted investment by the Costa Rican authorities (OECD, 2013 pp 57-58). Costa 
Rica has two major incentives regimes for the manufacturing sector, the free zone 
regime and the inward processing regime (OECD, 2013 pp 110-114). 
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The free zone regime is regulated through Law nr. 7210 of 23 November 1990 and 
the executive decree nr 34739-Comex-H from 2008 (OECD, 2013 p. 110). Under this 
regime incentives in form of tax exemptions are given to enterprises that qualify 
under 1 of the 5 targeted sectors as stipulated by the law. 
 
·       “Category A: export processing industries 
·         Category B: Trading Companies 
·         Category C: Service Industries 
·         Category Ch: Free Zone parks managing companies 
·         Category D: Corporation or Organizations in scientific research 
·         Category E: Ship repair, maintenance, construction or other related activities 
·         Category F: Processing Companies” 
Source: Asamblea Legislativa de Costa Rica, 1990 
 
For companies fitting into the category, other conditions as stipulated by law may 
apply. These conditions are: 
 
Box 1. Conditions to qualify under the FZR 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2013: p. 111 (Box 3.3) 
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The inward processing regime was created in order to increase exports by 
allowing both local and international companies to import with suspension of all 
customs duties and with a rate of tariffs of 1% (if applicable). With the condition that 
companies then re-export all input imported without custom duties or the majority of 
it (with a small part going to the local market and paying its taxes in that transaction) 
before a certain timeframe (specific for different imports). The other condition for this 
regime is then that the imported materials need to be repaired, assembled, 
reconstructed, transformed or incorporated into the owns company machinery before 
being re-exported (in order to create industrial activity rather than only temporary 
storage) (OECD 2013, pp 112-113). 
 
Access to these incentives are both allowed to locals and international investors as 
mentioned above, but they have been more effective in attracting FDI rather than 
local investment. The proportion of FDI shared by these two regimes in 
manufacturing FDI has shifted over the years but most of the FDI inflow has been 
focused in the Export Processing Zones (30% of all FDI entering Costa Rica from 
2006 to 2012) (OECD 2013, p. 54). The main reason for these policies to be good 
attractors of FDI according to the OECD is that there is a principle of non-
discrimination between nationals and foreigners in the political Constitution of Costa 
Rica, being then a fundamental constitutional right (OECD, 2013 p. 56, Constitución 
Política de Costa Rica, 1948, Art.68). Investors are assured that their property rights 
are well protected even as foreigners and therefore a good investment environment 
is created.  
 
These incentives by the government of Costa Rica have been a factor in the success 
of Costa Rica in attracting FDI and have impacted the overall economic development 
of Costa Rica. However, this success has not come without a cost. Because of all 
the exemptions of taxes mentioned above, the Costa Rican government do not gain 
any tax income from the foreign firms in the Free Zones. These missing revenues as 
measured in relation to percentage of GDP by the “Centro Interamericano de 
administraciones tributarias” (CIAT) account for 5.54% in 2010, 5.52% in 2011 and 
5,64% in 2012 (Trigueros, 2014 p.6). In addition to these tax expenditures, tax 
revenue as % of GDP has been recorded at 13,4% in 2011 (OECD 2013, World 
Bank). Therefore the Costa Rican Government may be not capable of maintaining 
  
55 
macroeconomic stability with these low tax revenues without reforming their 
incentives legislation and finding which tax exemptions are not necessary or more 
beneficial for the state to reform, while still being remaining attractive to investors. 
 
In this section incentive policies to FDI in Costa Rica have been explained, in the 
next section, an overview on how these policies have been implemented and 
promoted by the Investment promotion agency (CINDE) in Costa Rica. 
 
4.2.2 CINDE and the Intel Investment 
 
During the “lost decade” of the 80’s after the debt crisis the organisation Costa Rica 
Investment Promotion Agency (CINDE), was founded and for many years funded by 
a part of the vast amount of USAID as described earlier. The organisation was 
influential into the 90’s where it started to go directly after high-tech FDI (Rodriguez-
Clare, 2001). It was directly responsible for attracting a USD 300 mil. Investment by 
the electronics giant Intel and was in direct cooperation with the Figueres-Olsen 
administration (1994-1998), being the communicative link between the government 
and Intel (Paus, 2005). The main reason for pointing this out, is that it fits the 
argument that it is not really a planned move part of a long-term development 
scheme, but a mix of past investments in education and part of the USAID 
restructuring scheme.  
 
It is important to emphasise the impact of Intel’s investment. Besides Intel being 
responsible for a boom in FDI whose construction funds, for their plant  would 
represent six times Costa Rica’s annual FDI  and double the country’s total export 
from 1996-2000 (Spar,1998), it also might have provided what one could dub a 
signaling effect. Meaning that an investment of such a big firm in the business 
decides to do a big “greenfield” investment in Costa Rica with quite successful 
execution is something which puts Costa Rica on the map. This is an argument we 
have seen several places in the scholarship regarding the investment (Spar, 1998; 
Larrain et. al., 2000; Rodriguez-Clare, 2001), but it is also one where we have not 
found the sufficient qualitative data to demonstrate clear causality. What we can also 
see in table 7, is that FDI in manufacturing has not really been steadily rising but has 
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seen significant fluctuations, something that might go against this “signalling” 
hypothesis.  
 
4.2.3 Global Circumstances and Increased Openness to FDI 
 
After having outlined the impact of the Structural adjustment programs in the 
preceding chapter, it is clear that Costa Rica’s initial increasing integration into the 
world economy was not part of a development plan by the Costa Rican 
government(s), but rather a product of a debt-driven ISI strategy combined with 
international economic development that caused Costa Rica, and many other 
developing countries, to fall into a debt-crisis and go to the IMF and the World Bank 
for economic assistance. Illustrative of this development, tariff rates have decreased 
substantially over time, as illustrated in table 11: 
 
Table 11: List of Tariff rates in Agriculture and Industry from 1995-2012 
 
 
Source: Table made by the authors with numbers from the website of Ministerio de Comercio Exterior 
de Costa Rica (COMEX, ND) Online available at: 
http://datosabiertos.comex.go.cr/dashboards/7684/aranceles/ 
 accessed 26-05-2015 
 
It is very indicative of the unilateral trade agreements regarding tariffs, that the rate 
of tariffs on agriculture are significantly higher than the rate on industry, as a 
consequence of protectionist western agricultural practices and due to the loose 
restrictions on FDI regarding imported supply for the Export Processing zones, we 
also see that the amount of industrial imports have risen significantly as well, as one 
would expect with an open approach to FDI, as described in the theory chapter. 
 
This is something we will go back to later on in chapter 5, when we analyse the 
impact of FDI in Costa Rica. Due to the Structural adjustment programs being 
introduced in virtually every country in Latin America, competition for FDI has also 
increased in the region, as the companies have more options on where to invest. 
Also, after civil wars dying down in Central America this has also decreased Costa 
  
57 
Rica’s uniqueness in terms of its political stability, though it probably still gave them 
somewhat of an edge. This can be illustrated in the relatively long list of countries 
which Intel had on their list when scouting for countries in which to build their plant, 
including regional neighbors Chile, Brazil and Mexico (Spar, 1998). There also 
seems to be agreement in the scholarship on high-tech FDI in Costa Rica, that the 
Transnational corporations that were investing were doing it for reasons of efficiency, 
mainly looking for skilled labor at comparatively low costs (Paus, 2005) and not to 
get access to the domestic or the CACM (Central American Common Market) 
market, as it does not provide sufficient demand for such an industry. Keeping in line 
with our theoretical perspective, this means that the Transnational Corporations at 
least appear to have the superior leverage in the negotiation process. We therefore 
argue, that the loose restrictions on FDI in Costa Rica was an outcome of this 
uneven power relation. 
 
As noted by several of our sources, the argument that Costa Rica in general had an 
open approach to FDI, and not a particular approach to each individual investor, 
might also have been a factor that contributed to Costa Rica’s general ability to 
attract FDI (Spar, 1998; Larrain et al., 2000; Paus, 2005). This general commitment 
to an FDI based development strategy may have made Costa Rica an appealing 
long-term outlook and might also have contributed to the high ratio of greenfield 
investment (Paus, 2005). It has however also caused long-term structural problems 
with regards to insufficient tax funding for further industrial development, which will 
be expanded on further on in chapter 5. Another issue to raise is that the tax-free 
imports to the Export Processing Zones which may limit local supplier opportunities 
and might reduce spillovers and linkages. Something which we will also analyse later 
on. Lastly it is important to mention that Costa Rica’s geographical location has been 
a bonus in regards to U.S. trade where on average from 2004 to 2014 they have 
received 39.49% of all Costa Rican exports (Comex, 2015) because the US 
administrations have been placing increased emphasis on outsourcing (Paus, 2005). 
After analysing some of the key global factors, we will now conclude on the overall 
factors of attraction of FDI in Costa Rica. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
 
In a process initiated by a combination of the economic strategy and global 
economic circumstances, the Costa Rican debt crisis in the 80’s caused the 
government to seek out international financial institutions which put into practice 
neoliberal policies that included a deregulation of FDI and reduced restrictions on 
imports. This period sharply defined the development path of Costa Rican 
development for the next period which included a significant increase in FDI flowing 
into the country. Due to the country’s relative strength especially in the areas of 
education, infrastructure and political stability, where many efforts to improve these 
sectors were taken before the debt crisis of the 80’s, the Costa Rican economy had 
an advantage over other countries that attract FDI. In addition, a general policy of 
openness towards FDI and incentive regimes marketed to foreign firms by the 
USAID created CINDE played also a big part in attracting transnational corporation 
to Costa Rica. CINDE was able to attract large amounts of FDI in the high-tech 
manufacturing sector, diversifying Costa Rica’s exports and increasing the amount of 
exports leaving the country. The impact that this FDI has had in the country will now 
be explored in the next chapter. 
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5. Assessing the impact of FDI in Costa Rica 
 
As we have examined how Costa Rica attracted high technology FDI through a 
combination of private and public efforts, we will now explore how FDI and especially 
high technology FDI has influenced Costa Rican development. We will argue that 
FDI has increased exports and spurred growth in Costa Rica, but it has not 
succeeded in creating more positive effects, since the increase in exports has 
happened simultaneously with an increase in imports and tax revenues have not 
increased on par with growth, plus “the no strings attached” approach pursued has 
diminished the ability to have linkages and spillovers. In doing so, we will explore 
general economic impacts, and then we will explore the impacts FDI have in the 
local economy through backward linkages and spillovers.  
 
5.1 General impact of FDI in Costa Rica 
In terms of the overall economy, the use of FDI had the apparent effect intended for 
it to have. Exports from Costa Rica to international markets have been increasing at 
a high rate since 1998. However, fluctuations in exports have happened mainly due 
to the IT-crisis of the late 90’s, which cause a significant downturn in demand which 
by extension caused Costa Rican growth to slow down (Larraín et. al. 2000). This 
could be deemed as a risk of targeting one specific sector and as Paus (2005) notes, 
we now see that this industry also behaves cyclically. 
 
Although neoclassical theory postulates that an increase in exports will lead to a total 
increase in the development of the country, some aspects of this increase in exports 
need clarification. First, this increase in exports in Costa Rica has come about with a 
great increase of tax-free imports due to the Export Processing Zones scheme 
(where most Transnational Corporations are located). The Export Processing Zones 
scheme is one of the main reasons for the location of Transnational Corporations in 
Costa Rica due to the following benefits which the policy includes: 
 
“100% exemption on import duties on raw materials, com­ponents and capital goods 
100% exemption on taxes on profits for eight years, and 50% on the following four 
years 
100% exemption on export taxes, local sales and excise taxes, and taxes on profit 
repatriation 
100% exemption on municipal and capital taxes 
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No restrictions on capital repa-triation or foreign currency man-agement 
Fully expedited on-site customs clearance 
Ability to sell to exporters within Costa Rica 
Ability to sell up to 40% in the local market with exemption from sales tax” (MIGA, 
2006 p.8) 
 
These benefits are entitled to any company in the free zone parks established zones 
(and Intel, which factory’s size, implied a change in the law in order to be a free zone 
park on its own (MIGA, 2006). An example of Transnational Corporations exerting 
power in the political sphere of Costa Rica. 
 
The “no strings attached” approach to the import of foreign capital goods and raw 
materials might not result only in an increase in exports but also in an increase in 
imports, because Transnational Corporations do not pay the same rate of taxes on 
imports and therefore is more profitable to buy from international markets than local 
suppliers, so it doesn’t lead to any linkages between the foreign companies and local 
suppliers. This is illustrated in figure 8: 
 
 Figure 8. Commercial influx in the Costa Rican industrial sector 1995-2013 , 
in Millions of U.S. Dollars 
 
Source: Figure from the Ministerio de comercion exterior (COMEX) website 
http://datosabiertos.comex.go.cr/dashboards/8868/intercambio-comercial/ accessed 16-05-15 
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Whereas it is a good scheme for attraction of FDI once companies are set in the 
country it may not be beneficial in the long run (Cordero & Paus, 2008). Therefore, 
although exports have increased, imports have as well. In addition Government 
income as a percentage of GDP has not increased likewise as shown in table 12. 
This has historically been tackled through the requirements attached to imports but 
due to the present non-taxation of imports and also because of the fact that 
companies located in Export Processing Zones have an exemption in profit tax the 
first 12 years of producing in Costa Rica, as stated above. 
 
Therefore, although growth has occurred, the reality of the situation is that to keep 
being attractive to high value added manufacturing FDI, Costa Rica needs to 
increase public spending in order to maintain its comparatively well educated 
workforce and the relatively good infrastructure created after the initial demands in 
the 90’s for better infrastructure from the first wave of investors in the country (which 
implied some improvements in the road system and electricity grids) (MIGA 2006). 
Therefore, the little increase in tax income as a cause of Transnational Corporations 
not paying any taxes can affect the materialization of this economic growth into 
human development. As shown by the high levels of inequality (Gini coefficient of 
48.6 in 2012 (World Bank, N.D.) the country has (Cordero & Paus, 2008). 
 
Table 12. Costa Rica’s Tax Ratio 1987-2004, in Total tax income as a percentage of 
GDP 
Year 1987 1988 1989    1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Tax 
income 
as % of 
GDP 
11.22 10.97 11.03 10.81 11.30 11.88 11.99 11.59 12.34 12.55 12.53 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2010 2011 2012 
Tax 
income 
as % of 
GDP 
12.56 11.94 12.29 13.22 13.22 13.35 13.36  13.4 13.7 13.6 
Source: Table made by Cordero & Paus with numbers from the Ministerio de Hacienda and Banco 
Central de Costa Rica cited in Cordero & Paus, 2008 p.13. In addition numbers from 2010 to 2012 
have been added by the authors and collected from the World Bank (N.D.). Online, available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2010+wbapi_dat
a_value+wbapi_data_value-first&sort=desc accessed 20-05-2015  
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As of 2013, Costa Rica has succeeded in diversifying its economy, transforming its 
exports from mainly agricultural products from the primary sector to high-technology 
manufacturing (which now represent around 20% of Costa Rica’s GDP) through FDI 
(OECD, 2013).  At the same time the service sector has also increased in the last 20 
years now employing 25% of the Costa Rican population (OECD, 2013). This has 
led to a decrease of poverty and an increase in overall development. Although these 
successes need to be contrasted as an increase in inequality and criminality has 
also happened in the last 10 years due mainly to the loss of economic resources 
from the government (Cordero & Paus, 2008; OECD, 2013). Overall, the impact of 
FDI and openness towards it have been positive for the development of the country, 
but measures need to be taken in order for Costa Rica to remain an attractive 
country for FDI. 
  
5.2 Backward-Linkages and Spillovers 
Although the positive outcome of FDI are more evident in terms of the general 
economy of Costa Rica, in order to determine the effects of spillovers, we need to 
examine the qualitative aspects of the Costa Rican economy. Albeit that, it is clear 
that knowledge spillovers have happened while backward-linkages are harder to 
come about. Progress has been made and we will explore why more progress has 
not been accomplished. 
 
Many programs have been put into practice in order to unite the Transnational 
Corporations in the Costa Rican Export Processing Zones and local suppliers, in 
order to accomplish this, some factors need to be accounted for. One of the main 
factors is the necessity or capacity of the Costa Rican local producers, supplying 
Transnational Corporations with inputs. In order to supply for high value 
manufacturing, the quality and productivity of local suppliers had to be increased. In 
the end, various organizations were created for that purpose. One of them, Costa 
Rica PROVEE (a plan organized by the chamber of commerce (Cámara de comercio 
de Costa Rica) has been deemed the most successful, for example, they have been 
able to connect approximately 400 Costa Rican firms to supply Transnational 
Corporations in Export Processing Zones (Cordero & Paus, 2008). One of the most 
recognized examples is that of Intel, which has connections with up to 200 firms in 
Costa Rica that supply it with different kinds of inputs. However, these inputs only 
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represents little of the value added of Intel’s and other transnational corporations 
production (Larrain et.al.,2000). This means that most of the input Costa Rica’s 
companies supply is not in high technology products. This supply consists mostly of 
packaging, metal and plastic parts and services, given that local companies are not 
capable of supplying inputs for high value-added products to Transnational 
Corporations since technological transfers have not occurred (Cordero & Paus, 
2008).  
 
The major problem that local companies face, according to transnational 
corporations2, is capability, is that the quality of the local products and their 
processes of production are not of the quality and competitiveness required in order 
to be able to supply Transnational Corporations in a highly competitive world market, 
and most of the local companies do not have international certification of quality 
(Beltran & Gutierrez, 2007 in Monge-Naranjo, 2007). Therefore, another strategy 
pursued was to attract FDI from the suppliers of the Transnational Corporations. 
CINDE’s solution was to try to attract international suppliers of Transnational 
Corporations from different sectors. For that reason, the Costa Rican government 
through consultants such as CINDE have made possible the connection of supply 
companies to the medical sector and the electronics sector, to give an example. This 
strategy has not been an overall success, since international suppliers alleged that 
there was a high risk in doing business in Costa Rica, because even with the 
presence of high tech Transnational Corporations the local market was too small. 
(Cordero & Paus, 2008). 
 
Regarding this there have been certain areas of the Costa Rican economy where 
local producers have been able to compete with foreign producers due to the costs 
of imports being too high for some of the smaller foreign firms. 
This has meant that some local companies had to reorganize their production 
process in order to become more productive and competitive to supply to these 
Transnational Corporations (Cordero & Paus, 2008).3 
 
                                               
2 Due to anonymity in the sources referenced, we do not know which Transnational Companies are 
referred to 
3 We have not been able to locate more relevant data for this phenomenon. 
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Therefore, it seems that if companies in Costa Rica were more prepared to transition 
into more high-tech products in order supply Transnational Corporations they would 
be able to do that, as Transnational Corporations seem willing to buy from the local 
industry, which would lead to more growth in local companies. These capability 
improvements can be accomplished in many ways. One of them being knowledge 
spillovers and training programs as is stated in our theory, the problem of the almost 
total liberalization of Costa Rican FDI is that it does not provide with a feasible 
framework where governments make the Transnational Corporations provide this 
connection to local suppliers or provide knowledge spillovers by stating it in their 
regulation or in the agreements signed by the government and those Transnational 
Corporations as other countries with high attraction of FDI, such as China and Korea 
have done (Chang, 2003). 
 
5.3 Knowledge Spillovers 
Costa Rica already had a better-educated workforce than the average in Latin 
America from the 90’s onwards (Larrain et. al., 2000), due to the efforts done by the 
country as seen in chapter 4. The arrival of high technology FDI meant the demand 
for an even more (and with a better quality) educated workforce. As an example of 
these demands, we can see how Intel, the biggest investor in Costa Rica, demanded 
that the engineering education in Costa Rica be adapted through counselling with 
the company and educational institutions in the west (Larrain et. al. 2000). 
Furthermore, Intel made the technologic Institute of Costa Rica, (Instituto 
Tecnológico de Costa Rica) an associate Intel institute, something that allowed the 
institute to be in a higher academic network, receiving connections with universities 
such as California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and being able to apply for funds 
for up to 300 million USD (although this are the total funds for all Intel associates 
leading to competition for funding) (Larrain et al. 2000). This allowed for 
improvement of the engineering curriculum by providing it with better funding, better 
access to new technology and made available exchange programs for engineering 
educations (Larrain et al. 2000).  
 
All these reforms in education also came in the form of technical education, creating 
access for 1-year technical educations in order to be able to work in a high 
technology manufacturing industry. All this reform in education led to a much better 
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educated workforce and a high demand from students for engineering courses in the 
universities the enrolment in engineering courses went from 9,5% in 1997 to 12,5% 
in 2000 out of the total of university enrolments (Larrain et. al. 2000). Not only 
because of the availability of jobs after ending education but also because of the 
comparatively higher salaries (Ibid.). Which allow workers for these Transnational 
Corporations to spend more money in Costa Rica. This increase in wages and 
increase in human capital could be seen as a counterbalance to the tax exemptions 
in the Export Processing Zones as in that way a part of the profits made from the 
manufacturing actually benefit the state, and is re-invested in Costa Rica, although it 
cannot account for the tax revenue loss. However, at the same time these linkages 
in education imply the allocation of more educational expenses from the government 
while transnational corporations only offer the possibility of investment in education 
rather than committing to invest in education. Thus, even a good promotion of 
human capital can be undermined by the lack of funds.This commitment to invest by 
transnational corporations could be accomplished by having more conditions in the 
free zone incentive regime, or in the individual agreements with transnational 
corporations before they settle in Costa Rica.  
 
Another important figure of this section is the flexibility of the workforce, in this case 
the fact that most knowledge spillovers come from past workers of Transnational 
Corporations who now work for a local company or has opened their own local 
companies, which leads to an increase in the productivity, quality and efficiency of 
the local industry. It is reported that around 36,2% of the managers, 
27,6% of engineers and 31,6% of technicians that work in local suppliers for 
transnational corporations (although not many linkages have been made as shown in 
the section above) in Costa Rica worked for Transnational Corporations in the Export 
Processing Zones before and arguments that this situation has improved the 
efficiency of local companies have been made (Monge et. al. 2012) . A survey 
conducted to ex employees of high technology Transnational Corporations showed 
that when asked about their activities after leaving the Transnational Corporations 
out of a sample of 1346 ex employees, 15,6% (210) of ex employees created their 
own companies (Leiva et.al. 2014 p.129). From these 210 ex employees, 44% 
argued that they benefitted from being part of the Transnational Corporations in 
order to be more productive and capable, from a wide array of answers the most 
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mentioned benefits are better training on how to deal with clients (11,4%), human 
resources (8%), and marketing (4%) (Leiva et.al. 2014 p 130). Although this may 
give us some more specific evidence that some knowledge spillover has happened 
in regards to labour mobility, it is also possible to see from the results of this survey, 
that  most of the perceived new knowledge is in the organizational aspects of the 
firm rather than in is productive processes through technology transfers, an 
explanation to this would be the small amount of linkages between transnational 
corporations and local suppliers, an increase in linkages would allow for an 
upgrading of the local technology product through technology transfers or reverse 
engineering, in order to make local companies competitive enough to compete in 
international markets.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Overall, FDI has had positive effects in Costa Rica looking at certain factors. Growth 
and exports have been stable and increasing since the 1990’s and local society has 
gained from FDI through the improvement of education (at least in the engineering 
and high tech manufacturing institutes and faculties). In addition, through training 
programs and labour flexibility, workers from Transnational Corporation change job 
place to local companies or become entrepreneurs, increasing local productivity in 
some aspects. 
 
However, attracting FDI through Export Processing Zones schemes and high 
government spending in different public sectors may have hurt the state budget, 
many companies have now been in Costa Rica for more than 12 years, which will in 
turn mean that government funding through taxes may increase in future years, plus 
the added higher wages improving the spending capabilities of many Costa Ricans. 
However, one has to be critical of the knowledge spillovers and linkages 
accomplished, since the linkages of input are mostly in low and medium 
manufacturing (for example: packaging, metal and plastic pieces and services) which 
do not add much value to Transnational Corporations exports. In regards to the local 
industry outside of Export Processing Zones, their productivity and capacity have not 
been increasing substantially over time. This has left Costa Rica highly dependant 
on FDI inflows rather than having created a solid industrial base, keeping Costa Rica 
in a highly competitive environment for the attraction of FDI which does not actually 
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increase local industrial capabilities. Furthermore the lack of noticeable increase in 
tax revenue is going to keep them at a disadvantage in keeping themselves 
competitive, especially against a giant like China. 
 
 
6. Project Conclusion 
 
In the introduction, we posed the question: How has the governments of Costa Rica 
used FDI to increase production in high-tech manufacturing and what has been the 
impact of the strategy pursued? In order to answer the question we started out by 
examining the history of economic development in Latin America and Costa Rica’s 
place in that history. We found that Costa Rica shared a lot of the same development 
patterns as the rest of the region most noticeably regarding the shared experiences 
of a debt-driven ISI strategy which led to an economic crisis followed by austerity 
measures and deregulation in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank and in the case of Costa Rica also USAID. We found that this strategy 
by extension led to a bigger emphasis on FDI as a tool for economic growth and that 
due to the relatively educated and relatively cheap skilled labour, which Costa Rica 
possessed, made them competitive in attracting this FDI. In addition, we found that 
the political stability and general commitment to an FDI driven economic 
development which included substantial incentives for foreign investors had a big 
importance in regards to attracting FDI. We also discover, however, that this “loose” 
approach to FDI has come with its costs. Costa Rica has not been able to offset its 
significant trade deficits, mainly due to the decreasing tariffs included in the 
neoliberal reforms increasing competition for local producers. Additionally, the FDI 
led strategy has not been able to significantly increase tax revenues, which will make 
it harder to keep a competitive advantage or upgrade productive capabilities. There 
has also been the increase in inequality apart from the social consequences of this 
can under certain conditions cause an increase in criminal activity. There has been a 
low degree of knowledge spillovers. We have found that this is in large part is 
because of an inability to create linkages between the foreign firms, usually 
operating in the Export Processing Zones, to domestic producers since the latter 
having been able to compete with the duty free foreign imports. We have mainly 
found significant spillovers to be in relation to former employers of TNCs finding jobs 
in the domestic sector. This outcome can generally be said to fit our overall 
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theoretical framework, which highlight a pro-active and regulatory stance on FDI. 
Other benefits from FDI in Costa Rica include a few linkages to local producers of 
low and medium manufactured goods, a few years after the initial Intel investment 
with a better trade balance, and wage increases for employees working in the Export 
Processing Zones. 
 
The main problem here is that the incentives provided for FDI, which include 
beneficial tax exemptions, have structured the Costa Rican economy in a way that 
has promoted investments that only provides limited tax revenues and linkages to 
domestic producers. While such problems to FDI are not new one could point to the 
probability that Costa Rica might not have been able to produce high-tech 
manufactured goods without the assistance of Transnational Corporations as the 
level of the sophistication in the local economy is perceived as lower compared to 
the western countries that operate in these industries.  
 
The low degree of supplier linkages as a crucial aspect where possible revenue and 
industrial development of course theoretically could have been created. This is a 
point where some economists are likely to focus on the absorptive qualities of the 
host nation and might just conclude that they have not been present to a satisfactory 
degree. This may or may not be true in Costa Rica, but the most important thing to 
emphasise is that there has not really existed the circumstances to test out the 
absorptive capabilities of the Costa Rican economy because there has not been any 
content requirements or the like to trigger linkages between local and foreign firms.  
 
What we have here is more of a “Myrdalian” phenomenon, where the most 
productive parts of the economy is separated from the rest of economy. The main 
reason being that global circumstances have created competition on the part of 
middle-income countries trying to attract high-tech FDI that is much larger than at the 
time of the development of the East Asian Miracles. So while it is easy, and perhaps 
advisable, to use the East Asian Miracles as a proxy for good development we find 
that it might be hard to argue that the same constructive regulative policies would 
have been feasible in this period. A constructive target for further inquiry therefore 
would be to look at the competition for FDI between the relevant countries which 
have the capabilities to attract FDI in high-tech manufacturing. 
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This might be able to shed light on how much regulation a country can expect to 
impose on FDI and if it in the international economy of today the FDI strategies 
pursued by countries such as South Korea and Taiwan are feasible. 
 
Regardless, the strategy pursued by the different Costa Rican governments has put 
the country into an FDI led development trajectory which does not provide sufficient 
linkages to the rest of the economy will quite possibly make it hard for the country to 
keep an edge over other competitors and with the possibility of newcomers into the 
sector and the rise of China might provide an even gloomier future prospects. An 
example of this could be the decision of Intel, the biggest exporter of costa rica, to 
move its manufacturing of semiconductors to China at the beginning of 2015, 
reducing its number of employees in Costa Rica by approximately 50% (Rodriguez, 
2014; Barquero, 2014). Again, due to the inability to provide linkages with local 
industry Costa Rica will probably continue to have problems with its trade balance in 
the future, as the duty-free imports most likely will be too competitive for local 
producers. It will be interesting to see if any future administrations, will change the 
current policies and adapt a more regulatory stance on FDI in order solve these 
structural issues within the Costa Rican economy. Looking at our theoretical 
framework it would be beneficial for the Costa Rican state to for instance set input 
requirements for foreign firms, or slowly demand a tax of the revenues generated by 
foreign firms.  
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